Mr. Speaker, I thank the

gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, if our goal is to disarm

Iraq, I believe the best way to accomplish

that goal would be to utilize the

strategy articulated a few weeks ago

by Secretary of State Colin Powell,

that is, to reinstate, utilizing established

rules and supported by multilateral

military force if necessary. This

policy has the best chance of working,

and it has the support of the international

community. If military force

is needed to enforce the inspections, it

will be targeted, focused, and not requiring

a massive invasion force. It

will be unlikely to provoke widespread

warfare all over the Middle East; and it

is just as likely to fulfill the goal of

disarming Iraq as widespread bombing.

If on the other hand we merely start

dropping bombs, how do we even know

where to bomb if we have not inspected

first? If we do know where the weapons

are, those locations can be placed first

on the inspection list, and if there is

any resistance to the inspection, multilateral

military force could be targeted on those sites.

But today we are discussing a resolution

authorizing the use of force before

the inspectors have even had an opportunity

to do their jobs. This resolution

represents the last opportunity for

Congress to have a meaningful input in

the decision to go to war, and unfortunately

there are many problems and

unanswered questions with granting

this authority now.

The first problem is that although

the resolution suggests that the President

first try to work with the U.N.,

that provision is unenforceable. This is

a problem especially because the President

has already stated that he did not

need the United Nations, and this resolution

allows the President to just notify

Congress that, based on the authority

granted in this resolution, he

has decided to attack Iraq. Furthermore,

the broad authority granted in

this resolution is inappropriate because

of the timing of this vote, less than a

month before the election.

Twelve years ago under the first

President Bush, the vote to use military

force in the Persian Gulf was

taken after the election. The timing of

this resolution also raises questions because

there is nothing shown to be urgent

about the situation in Iraq. If the

President discovers that the U.S. is in

imminent danger, he is already authorized

to defend the Nation and no one

would expect him to wait for a congressional

resolution. If the argument is

that the urgency was created a year

ago on September 11, the evidence supporting

the connection between 9–11

and Iraq is at best tenuous.

In addition to these problems, granting

the authority in the resolution is

premature because many questions are

unanswered. For example, what plans

have been made for the governance of

Iraq after we win the war? And what

chance is there that a regime change

will create any better situation than

we have now? And to the extent that

Iraq has chemical and biological weapons,

is it a good idea to invade Iraq and

place our troops right in harm’s way?

And what will the war cost, and how will we pay for it?

Eighteen months ago we had the

largest budget surplus in American history.

Today even without the cost of a

war, we are approaching the largest

deficit in American history with huge

deficits already projected for the next

10 years. So what is the plan to pay for

the war? Are we going to cut funds for

education and health care? Are we

going to raise taxes, or will we just run

up additional deficits? And what will

the domino effect be? If we attack Iraq,

Iraq may attack Israel, Israel will attack

back, and then everyone in the

Middle East will choose sides, and how

will that make us better off than we are now?

If we are to make progress against

terrorism, we have to recognize that

hate is as big an enemy as complex

weapons. That hatred may increase because

others will resent the fact that

we have chosen to apply rules to others

that we are unwilling to have applied

to us. We would not tolerate applying

regime change to the United States,

nor would we accept preemptive strikes

as an acceptable international policy.

The CIA has now reported that the

chance that Iraq will use chemical or

biological weapons has actually increased

since all of the talk about a war began.

Mr. Speaker, all of these problems

persist and questions remain unanswered,

and they lead to the same basic

uncertainty. What is the plan both before

and after the war and what are the

consequences? Some have argued that

a vote against the resolution is a vote

to do nothing. That is not true. We

should act, but based on the information

we now have, I believe the wisest

course is to proceed with the strategy

proposed by Colin Powell, and that is

U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq enforced

with multilateral military

power. That strategy has the support of

the international community. It is

most likely to actually disarm Iraq; it

does not require a massive unilateral

invasion force; and it reduces the risk

of provoking widespread armed conflict

in the Middle East and terrorism in the United States.

I therefore urge my fellow Members

to vote against the resolution.

Mr. Speaker, these votes on the Iraq resolution

pose difficult questions for all of us. A

large part of the difficulty is caused by the Administration’s

inconsistent policies on what we

should do, when we should do it, and whose

approval we need. Not many days ago, the

Administration articulated the policy that it

could proceed unilaterally, without U.N. support,

and without Congressional approval, to

attack Iraq, with a preemptive strike, without

the necessity of an imminent threat to the

United States, for the purpose of ‘‘regime

change’’. On one recent Sunday, Vice President

CHENEY and Secretary of State Powell

articulated inconsistent descriptions of the Administration’s

policy. This resolution, which the

Administration is now supporting, repudiates

the initial Administration policy by requiring the

Administration to seek both U.N. cooperation

and Congressional approval. Last weekend,

the Boston Globe began an article on the Administration’s

position on Iraq with the sentence

‘‘As administration officials struggle to

reach an agreement with U.S. allies about

Iraq, President Bush has been shifting his

rhetoric in favor of less aggressive language

that emphasizes disarming Saddam Hussein

rather than ousting him.’’ So because of these

constant changes, formulating a response to

the Administration’s position has been difficult.

The first question we must address is this:

what is the goal? If the goal is to disarm Iraq,

I believe that the best way to accomplish that

goal would be to utilize the strategy articulated

a few weeks ago by Secretary of State Powell:

reinstate U.N. inspections, utilizing the established

rules, supported by multilateral military

force, if necessary. This policy has the best

chance of working. At a minimum, it is an important

first step. And it has the support of the

international community. If military force is

needed to enforce the inspections, it will be

targeted, focused and not requiring a massive

invasion force; it would be unlikely to provoke

widespread warfare all over the Middle East;

and it is also just as likely to fulfill the goal of

disarming Iraq as widespread bombing.

If, on the other hand, you merely start dropping

bombs—how do you even know where to

bomb, if you haven’t inspected first? If you do

know where the weapons are, those locations

could be placed first on the inspection list, and

if there is any resistance to the inspection,

multilateral military force could be targeted to those sites.

But today we are discussing a resolution authorizing

the use of force, before inspectors

have had an opportunity to do their jobs. Unlike

the first Administration resolution offered a

few days ago, this resolution does require the

President to cooperate with Congress and to

try to work with the U.N. This resolution is not

as broad as the previous draft. It is limited to

Iraq, not the entire Middle East, but it still

gives the President the authority to attack, if

*he* determines it to be necessary and appropriate.

This resolution represents the last opportunity

for Congress to have meaningful input in

the decision to go to war. And unfortunately

there are many problems and unanswered

questions with granting this authority now.

The first problem is that although the resolution

suggests that the President try to work

with the U.N., the provision is unenforceable.

The President merely has to notify Congress,

if he chooses to launch an attack. If we are

truly interested in making sure that the President

fully exhausts diplomatic efforts before

using force, then the resolution should not authorize

a military attack without a subsequent

statement from Congress.

There is a consensus in the United States

that we should work with the U.N. to the extent

possible. But after this vote, Congress will

have no opportunity to require meaningful efforts

to seek cooperation with the U.N. This is

a problem especially because the President

has already state his disdain for the U.N. by

saying at first that he didn’t need the U.N.,

and when he finally sought U.N. support, he

implied that if they failed to support the United

States, he would proceed to attack without

them. Furthermore, the Administration is now

insisting on new, unprecedented rules for inspections,

a position which may provoke Iraq

into resisting the inspections and creating an

unnecessary impasse at the U.N. A more prudent

strategy would be to require the President

to come back to Congress and explain

that he made the good faith effort to work with

the U.N.—rather than allowing the President to

just notify Congress that based on the authority

granted in this resolution, he had decided

to attack Iraq.

Furthermore, the broad authority granted by

this resolution is inappropriate, because of the

timing of this vote—less than a month before

the election. This problem is magnified by the

fact that nearly all of the President’s statements

on the need for this resolution have

been made at partisan political fundraisers,

where he attacks Democratic officeholders.

Twelve years ago—under the first President

Bush—the vote to use military force in the

Persian Gulf was taken after the election. That

would be a good model to follow, because

then members voted without the interests of

personal political considerations competing

with the national interests.

The timing of the vote on this resolution also

raises questions because there is nothing urgent

about the situation with Iraq. We have

the same information now that we had 2 years

ago. For example, we have known that Iraq

has had the capability to build biological and

chemical weapons for years; in fact we know

this because they bought some of the materials

from the United States. Furthermore, no

case has been made that there is an imminent

threat to the United States. So why is it essential

for the President to have the authority to

attack Iraq now? If the President discovers

that the United States is in imminent danger,

he is already authorized to defend the nation,

and no one would expect him to wait for a

Congressional Resolution. So what is different

now? If the argument is that the urgency was

created a year ago on September 11th, the

evidence supporting the connection between

9/11 and Iraq is at best tenuous. So what is

the urgency to authorize force right before the election?

Another problem with the broad authority

granted in the resolution is that this issue appears

to be personal for the President. He admitted

as much when he described Saddam

Hussein as ‘‘the man who tried to kill my

Dad.’’ The United States should not go to war

to settle a personal vendetta.

In addition to these problems, granting the

authority in the resolution is premature because

many questions are unanswered. For

example, if the President uses the authority

granted in this resolution and attacks Iraq,

what plans have been made for the governance

of Iraq after we win the war.

And what chance is there that a regime

change will create any better situation than we

have now. We cannot forget that the United

States was involved in the regime change in

Cuba in which Batista was kicked out and we

ended up with Castro. So why isn’t it likely

that Iraq will select someone who hates us

even more than Saddam Hussein.

And other questions need to be addressed,

such as, to the extent that Iraq has chemical

and biological weapons, is it a good idea to invade

Iraq and put our troops right in harm’s

way. ‘‘And what will the war cost and how will

we pay for it? There is no question that we

are willing to pay whatever it costs to be successful

in the war, but we can’t ignore the

questions of ‘‘how long’’ and ‘‘how much

money.’’ Eighteen months ago, we had the

largest budget surplus in American history.

Today, even without the costs of a war, we

are approaching the largest deficit in American

history, with huge deficits projected for the

next 10 years. The direct costs of the war

have been estimated at $100 billion; the indirect

costs, such as higher oil costs, have not

even been estimated. And so, what will we be

giving up in terms of being able to fund education

and health care and other needs here

in the United States? Or is the plan to raise

taxes? Or is the plan to just run up more deficits?

What will be the domino effect? If we attack

Iraq, Iraq will attack Israel, Israel will attack

back, and then everyone in the Middle East

will choose sides. How will that make us better

off than we are now, especially in our fight

against terrorism?

And in the end, what will we have won? In

making progress against terrorism, we have to

recognize that hate is as much of an enemy

as complex weapons. The weapons used to

cause mass destruction on 9/11 were

boxcutters. Firearms and explosives are easily

available in the United States and can be

used against buildings or modes of transportation.

If the result of the war is that others

hate us worse than they do now, then we

have to understand that suicide bombings in

the United States may increase.

Moreover, that hatred may increase because

others will resent that we have chosen

to apply rules to others that we are unwilling

to have applied to us. We would certainly not

tolerate another country applying ‘‘regime

change’’ to the United States. And we would

never approve of preemptive strikes when

there is no imminent threat as an acceptable

international policy. Recently, the Administration

threatened Iraqi military personnel with

trials as war criminals; but the U.S. policy is

not to subject our personnel to the jurisdiction

of international criminal tribunals. The CIA has

now reported that the chance that Iraq will use

chemical or biological weapons has actually

increased since all of the talk about war began.

Mr. Speaker, all of these problems persist

and questions remain unanswered, and they

lead to the same basic uncertainty—what is

the plan, both before and after the war, and

what are the consequences. Some have argued

that a vote against the Resolution is a

vote to do nothing. That is not true. We should

act, but based on the information we have

now, I believe the wisest course is to proceed

with the strategy proposed by Secretary of

State Powell—U.N. weapons inspections in

Iraq enforced with multilateral military power.

That strategy has the support of the international

community; it is most likely to actually

disarm Iraq; it does not require a massive, unilateral

invasion force; and it reduces the risk

of provoking widespread armed conflict in the

Middle East and terrorism in the United States.

I therefore urge my fellow members to vote

against this resolution.